Marquette Law Review
Volume 49
Issue 1 Summer 1965

Article 7

The Jury Instruction Process - Apathy or Aggressive
Reform?
Wylie A. Aitken

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Wylie A. Aitken, The Jury Instruction Process - Apathy or Aggressive Reform?, 49 Marq. L. Rev. 137 (1965).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol49/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

COMMENTS
THE JURY INSTRUCTION PROCESSAPATHY OR AGGRESSIVE REFORM?
One of the greatest fictions known to the law is that a
jury of twelve laymen can hear a judge read a set of instructions
once, then understand them, digest them, and correctly apply
them to the facts in the case. It has taken the judge and the
lawyers years of study to understand the law as stated in those
instructions.'
No area of jury trial procedure has been more troublesome or perplexing to both the bench and the bar than that phase of the trial described as the instruction process, where the jury is given the law which
is to govern the controversy they have been called upon to decide. An
answer to the problem has proved so elusive that in many instances
instructions are approached with a good deal of apathy, if in fact, the
problem is approached at all. A law-professor, in the process of lecturing on trial procedure, recently remarked as an introductory statement
to the subject of instructions: "Now we come to one of the most meaningless phases of the trial." Professor Farley, writing in the Yale Law
Journal, described the apathy which has settled among the members
of the legal profession:
The priests, however, are not fooled by the system evolved.
The lawyers and judges are perfectly aware that juries pay
scant attention to the type of instructions commonly given them
on the law applicable to the facts and, that as a rule, they are
incapable of the fine discrimination such an application requires.
But it is impressive to the public and it clothes the jurors with
a sanctimonious mantle of enlightment which gives them a
sense of peace and accord with authority. Trial lawyers may
consume a great deal of time on instructions, but little of it is
wasted on attempting to force the jury's attention to them. It is
usually as futile as reading a decision of the Supreme Court to
a justice
of the peace or arguing the Constitution with a police2

man.

It has been often stated that the purpose and goal of the ideal jury
instruction is to give light and guidance to the jury. It should give the
jury a fair understanding of the issues of the cause, outline the questions of fact to be determined, and convey a comprehension of the applicable principles of law.3 It has been stated that the verdict of a jury
who does not comprehend the law amounts to "crackerbarrel justice."'
1 Swain, Common Sense in Jury Trials, 30 CAL. S. B.

J. 405, 412 (1955).
2 Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE

L. J.194, 213 (1932).
3 State v. Stout, 49 Ohio St. 282, 30 N.E. 437 (1892) ; Holman Live Stock Co.
v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 81 Fla. 194, 87 So. 750 (1921).
423 MICH. L. REv. 276, 278 (1925).
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Admissions of many esteemed members of the bar illustrate that such
justice and jury lawlessness results more often than not.
The history of the origin of jury instructions is as clouded as the
origin of the jury trial itself. As one author has stated, it is safe to
assume that judges did not charge juries before the 12th Century since
there were no juries to charge.5 In the early 13th Century, trial by
jury began to evolve and though no mention is made of the instruction
ritual, it is safe to assume that at the time juries began to hear and
decide cases, judges began to instruct juries. Originally, the judge was
given a free hand over instructions, both as to content and the procedure to be followed. Abuses of this discretion, particularly the "bullying" of juries by a number of judges, led to the adoption of certain
restraints. In the United States, these restraints were instituted during
colonial and pioneer times. The restrictions were based on the theory
that in the area of factual determinations, the jury was supreme and
that the charge of the judge could be on matters of law only. This fear
of the power of the judge and fear of an abuse of that power also led
to the adoption of indirect restraints such as the requirement that all
instructions be in writing. 6 Many of these restrictions are with us today
and their effect upon the attainment of more meaningful instructions
will be discussed at a later point in this article.
For the purposes of this article, there will be no attempt to distinguish between criminal and civil procedure as to instructions since
the process followed is generally the same. It should be noted, however,
that instructions to the jury are considered so essential to the accomplishment of justice that in criminal proceedings the judge is almost
universally under a strict duty to charge the jurymen, while in a number
of jurisdictions there is no duty to charge in civil cases absent a request by counsel.7 Criminal instructions are sometimes also subjected to
a higher standard during review at the appellate level.
Throughout the years, the main concern in the area of instructional
enlightenment of the jury had been whether the particular charge given
by the judge correctly stated the applicable law. This is particularly
true of courts at the appellate level, since having only a bare record
before them there was no way for the court to determine whether or
not the instruction was understood." Strict legal correctness being the
primary concern of the courts at the appellate level, it naturally became

5 Sokolov, The Judge's Charge to the Jury in Criminal Cases, 10

CAN. B. REx,.
228 (1932).
6 Wright, Adequacy of Instructions to the Jury, 53 MIcH. L. REv. 505 (1955)..
7 Commonwealth v. Ferko, 269 Pa. 39, 112 Atl. 38 (1920) ; Martin v. State, 17
Ga. App. 516, 87 S.E. 715 (1916); State v. Lackey, 230 Mo. 707, 132 S.W.
602 (1910). See also, Duty to Instruct in Missouri Felony Cases, 1963 WASH.
U. L. Q. 353.
s Edwards v. Hill-Thomas Lime & Cement Co., 378 Ill. 180. 37 N.E. 2d 801
(1941) ; Yates v. Manchester, 358 Mo. 894, 217 S.W. 2d 541 (1949) ; Farley,
supra note 2.
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the main concern of the trial judge, who was fearful that his charge
might be struck down by the higher courts. Due to this appellate scrutiny, instruction became a formality, and the original purpose of giving
instructions for the actual enlightenment of the jury to assist them in
applying the law to the facts, became inconsequential. This formalism
and use of technically correct legal language has been skillfully described for us.
After the argument to the jury, we judges don our robes and
go forth in the battle of justice v. evil with our 'book'. Our part
in the trial is beginning, our script is set, the scriptual lesson for
the day is 'negligence'. The language must not vary except that
we might insert the names of the parties. We must not, however,
deviate from 'approved legal language'. Any desire to make the
ritual understandable must be suppressed for we must correctly
state the law even if it is not understood. To make the script
understandable wbuld be to risk reversal for an understandable
statement would not be in 'approved legal language'Y
Standard or pattern jury instructions 0 have added in alleviating
the problem of appellate court reversal, but they should not be looked
upon as a "cure all" for the defects in the area of instructions. They
often do not solve the problem of legal phraseology or the other defects which will be shown to exist.
In 1938 the American Bar Association, in response to the growing
dissatisfaction with instruction procedure and method, adopted its
minimum standards for trial practice. The standard governing instructions specifically provides that "(after) counsel have concluded their
arguments to the jury, the trial judge should instruct the jury orally
...and

should have power to advise them as to the facts...."11

The law in a number of jurisdictions does not meet the American
Bar Association standard. The proponents of the minimum standard
argue that rejection of various aspects of the standard contributes
greatly to the general insufficiency of jury instructions. They attest that
the obscurity of instructions results in a large part from the requirements in many states that they be written and be read to the jury verbatim, the primary factor toward meaningfulness being oral presenta2
tion, with the repetition and emphasis necessary to convey meaning.
In defense of written instructions, it has been stated that this requirement results in a charge which will be better considered and more
clearly expressed than an oral charge would ordinarily be.' 3 Perhaps
9 Winslow, The InstructionRitual, 13 HASTINGS L. J. 456 (1962).
10 For an example of the most advanced set of standard jury instructions, prepared by a committee of California Superior Court judges, see CALIFORNIA
JURY INSTRUCTIONS-

CRIMINAL

CIVIL

(4th ed. 1956);

CALIFORNIA

11 REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON TRIAL PRACTICE, 63

July, 1938).

See Wright, supra note 5, at 509.
1 State v. Rini, 151 La. 163, 91 So. 664 (1922).
12

JURY INSTRUCIONS -

(2d ed. 1957).
A.B.A. Rep. 551 (Adopted
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there should be some combination of the oral and written charge. This
would be favored by psychological considerations, since it is pointed out
that individuals receptive in varying degrees to the visual and auditory
14
methods of instruction.
The practice of having instructions precede the arguments of counsel has been criticized, in that by the time the jury has sat through the
bias and possibly heated comments of opposing counsel, what little law
the jury may have comprehended from the charge will have entirely
escaped them. It is said that this procedure leaves little chance for the
court's words to make any impression upon the jurors. The proponents
of charging before closing arguments argue that "such practice gives
counsel the opportunity to explain the instructions, argue their application to the facts, and thereby, give the jury the maximum assistance
in determining the issues and arriving at a good verdict on the law
and the evidence."' 5
The most direct restraint upon the judiciary in delivering instructions, and the restraint which has been soundly denounced as most
responsible for the inadequacy of instructions, is the requirement that
the charge, written or oral, contain nothing in the nature of comment
on the evidence adduced at the trial. Those jurisdictions which require
written instructions generally prohibit any reference to the facts of
the case in controversy even though the court expresses no opinion as
to weight to be given the facts mentioned. In jurisdictions where the
giving of oral instructions is not forbidden, it is within the province
of the court to sum up the evidence adduced upon the trial, so that
the jury may see the application of rules of law thereto, but this does
not authorize the court to comment on the evidence.' A summing up
of the evidence and an expression of opinion on a disputed question
of fact by the court is allowed in the federal courts and the courts of
those states which closely follow the common law, provided that the
jurors be told they are the exclusive judges of the facts and are not
bound by the opinions of the court on the facts.'" Advocates of the system argue that the judge should be allowed to sift through the evidence
presented and clarify various points, and connect this evidence with
the pertinent law involved.
If there is not at least a limited right to connect the applicable law
14 See ALLPORT & POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR (1947).
15 Raymond, Merits and Demerits of the Missouri System of Instructing Juries,
5 ST. Louis U. L. J. 317, 319 (1958).
16 Summary of the facts without comment is the permitted practice in perhaps
sixteen states. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 227-228 n. 9 (1949). The colorless summary has been called "a weakhearted compromise" by Dean Wigmore. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2551 n. 3
(3d ed. 1940).
17 The common law system is followed in the federal courts and in twelve states.
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2551 (3d ed. 1940). For a thorough analysis of the
various state procedures, see Wright, supra note 5.
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with specific facts, the instruction will amount to a mere statement of
abstract legal principles and definitions. Such instructions are based
on the assumption that a juror can learn the meaning of a word, e.g.
conspiracy, from the definition. Leading semanticists generally agree
that this is not possible. S. I. Hayakawa, in his work Language in
Thought and Action, states:
We learn the meanings of practically all our words (which are,
it will be remembered, merely complicated noises), not from
dictionaries, not from definitions, but from hearing these noises
as they accompany actual situations in life and 8 then learning
to associate certain noises with certain situations.'
In short, we learn words through the factual context in which the
word is used. 9 To derive meaning, we must be able to relate the words
utilized to our own experiences, as categorized in our memory.
As previously pointed out, the restraint upon judicial comment on
the facts grew out of a fear of the misuse of judicial power. It is
argued that the jury is best able to decide questions of fact, and that any
reference to the facts by the judge invades the province of the jury.
There seems to be a fear that the judge may lead the jury like sheep.
As Lord Bacon advised trial judges, "you should be a light to open
their eyes, but not a guide to lead them by the noses." 20
An analysis of this question would tend to support the proposition
that some amount of reference to the evidence by the presiding judge
would be desirable. Assuming that the judge should be allowed to
sort through the evidence and relate the law to the facts of each individual case, should the judge be allowed to comment on the weight
of the evidence? Approaching this 'question purely from the instructional-point of view, commenting on the weight of the evidence would
add little to understanding the law of the case. In federal courts, wherc
the ability to comment on the weight of the evidence is still present, it
is submitted that the quality of the judiciary is generally higher than
that of the state courts, and this power is only as advantageous as the
qualifications and impartiality of the person utilizing it. It would appear that a happy medium could be struck in this area. That is, the
judge could be permitted to sort through the facts in order to give
factual context to the abstract legal definitions and propositions contained within the instruction, but he should not be allowed to comment
on the weight of the evidence or unduly emphasize particular factual
evidence.
Little has been written on the method of presentation of jury in'8 HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION

57 (2d ed. 1964).

19 For other works which emphasize this point see KoRzYsi, ScIEcC AND SANlmy (4th ed. 1958) ; CHASE, TYRANNY OF WORDS (1959) ; OGDEN & RICHARDS,
THE MEANING OF MEANING (1959).
20 Quoted in-Norris v. Clinkscales, 47 S.C. 488, 25 S.E. 797, 805 (1896).
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structions, that is, the best manner of orally conveying the law to the
jury. To test the effectiveness of present technique, generalizations can
be drawn from investigations in the field of educational psychology.
The typical courtroom scene of twelve jurors being directed as to the
law by the judge can be likened to a classroom scene where a professor
is lecturing his students. The lecture method illustrates one means of
verbal learning.2 1 It has been often stated that selecting the best manner
of oral presentation by the judge to the jury, in order to make the
material more meaningful for them, is a problem within the sphere
of each individual judge and solely for his concern. It is submitted
that this is no more true than the proposition that teaching method is
a problem entirely to be dealt with by each individual teacher. The
voluminous material on teaching technique illustrates that method is
a concern of the teaching profession as a whole.
The manner of delivering instructions commonly in existence has
been described by one judge thusly:
One of the most widespread abuses is the manner in which
many judges deliver their instructions. First, there is the experienced judge who has given the same instructions for so many
years that he forgets he is giving them for the benefit of those
who have never heard them, and reads so rapidly and in such
a flat and unmodulated voice that it is difficult for anyone to
understand him. The opposite of this is the judge who looks in
amazement at the printed words before him and stumbles over
them as if it were his first experience with legal phraseology.
Probably the least helpful is the judge who mumbles or speaks
in such low tones that he cannot be heard, even by the most
attentive juror. One of the above types of delivery usually occurs after counsel has pointed out the sanctity of the law and
has repeatedly stressed that only by a complete understanding
of the instructions by His Honor can the jury render a verdict
based upon justice. Then the twelve unfortunate people in the
jury box, who have listened to days of testimony and oratorical
display by counsel, are suddenly confused and dismayed to hear
a delivery of one of the above types.22
A study on voice quality and its effect upon the ability to communicate verbal learning indicates that generally the voice quality of
the speaker does not hinder the speaker's ability to transfer information.2 3 The research did indicate that simulated breathy and nasal voice

quality appear to impede the transference of knowledge. In the case of
nasality, the hindrance is only slight. This test can also be cited in
considering another question: the ability to comprehend unfamiliar
material after one reading. College level students were presented a
21
22
23

See

AUSUBEL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MEANINGFUL VERBAL LEARNING

(1963).

Cunningham, Instructing Juries, 32 CAL. S. B. J. 127, 133 (1957).
Diehl & McDonald, Effect of Voice Quality on Communication, 21 J. oF.
SPEECH AND HEARING DISORDERS 233 (1956).
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fourteen minute lecture on birds, a subject with which the participants
were generally unacquainted. A recording by a skilled public speaker
was used to present the lecture and a simple recall type completion
test was given after the presentation. Of a possible mean score of 49,
a score of 28.81 was the highest attained. Other studies also indicate
that the average human mind cannot retain accurate details of precise
phraseology after one presentation.2 4 We can see, then, that a single
proposal of material is not adequate to convey a complete knowledge
of the information given, no matter how artful the performance. Applying these results to an exposition of law through the instruction
process, we see that one presentation of a principle of law may not be
sufficient, especially in light of the facts that jury intelligence is not
usually at the college level, nor is the judge necessarily a skilled public
speaker.
Another study in educational psychology indicates that increasing
the rate of the presentation can lead to a significant reduction in comprehension of the material given.2 5 A similar study shows that time
compression, (e.g. giving the same message in a shorter period of
material, though expressed in a different manner, can significantly
The results of these experiments would indicate that a trial judge
should be careful to pace his speech and, thereby, increase the understanding on the part of the jury.
A further study noted that verbal redundancy, (i.e. repetition of
material, though expressed in a different manner,) can significantly
increase the assimilation of material presented, though it generally decreases the comprehension of the material which is not repeated. 27 This
study shows that the repetition of certain key law principles within
the instruction would increase the understanding of these materials.
The danger, however, would be to over emphasize the comprehension
of a particular concept at the expense of another, thereby unconsciously favoring one of the litigants. However, further refinement of
the instruction could rectify this problem and accomplish a suitable
compromise. Psychologists make the further observation that the greater
the amount of material presented, the lesser the percentage thereof is
retained.2 s Courts, then, should be careful in drawing up instructions
and guard against unnecessary lengthiness.
24 Jones & English, Notional v. Rote Memory, 37 As!. J. PSYCH. 602 (1926).
25 Goldstein, Reading and Listening Comprehension at Various Controlled Rates,
TEACH. COLL. CONT. EDUC. no. 821 (1940).
26 Fairbanks, Guttman & Miron, Effect of Time Compression Upon the Compre-

hension of Connected Speech, 22 J. of SPEECH AND HEARING DIsoRERs 10
(1957).
27 Fairbanks, Guttman & 'Miron, Auditory Comprehension in Relation to Listening Rate and Selective Verbal Redundancy, 22 J. oF SPEECH AND HEARING
DISORDERS 23 (1957).

28

Newman, Effect of Crowding of Material on Curves of Forgetting, 52 All.
J. PSYCH. 601 (1939).
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Further experiments indicate that when one reads material aloud,
the reader utilizes longer sound phrases and less pauses. 29 We see,
therefore, that by merely reading the written instructions, and not
presenting them orally and with emphasis, the rate of presentation is
increased which, as shown previously, could significantly affect comprehension.
Voice inflection is also essential to a meaningful presentation of
verbal materials. Essential to communication is the attention of the
recipient to the stimulus being issued. Attention is the process of selecting the stimulus to which reaction will be made. At any given moment,
the mind can attend to only one stimulus. Attention is influenced by
several factors including (a) change, (b) intensity and striking quality,
(c) distance from point of fixation, (d) definite form or outline and
(e) training.30 The jurors must, to comprehend, focus their attention
upon the stimulus emanating from the judge. The more monotonous
the stimulus becomes, the more attention wanders, while any deviation
from the routine tends to attract and hold attention. 31 Loudness of the
voice will also affect the comprehension as this goes to the intensity
and striking quality of the stimulus.
A charge which is delivered without excessive use of notes is
more effective than a charge read with eyes glued upon a manuscript. If complete silence is commanded and movements in the
courtroom are prohibited during delivery of the charge, the effectiveness of the latter will be augmented. Oratorical effects
should be avoided as should also delivery of the charge in a
purely mechanical manner. That compelling tone of voice which
comes 3from
conviction is the most impressive that can be em2
ployed.

Since individuals are more or less responsive to visual or auditory
methods of instruction, as pointed out previously, some consideration
should be given to issuing to the jury a copy of the instructions before
the judge presents them orally. A procedure such as this would present
mechanical and financial problems, but beneficial results may far outweigh the inconvenience. Ancillary to this question is the procedure
whereby the jury is permitted to take written instructions into the jury
room during its deliberations. 33
With an impetus from the legal profession, and aid from those
versed in the field of educational psychology, tests dealing specifically
29 11 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 97 (1944).
30 DAVIs, PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING 328 (1935).
31 Id. at 328.
32 Rossman, The Judge-Jury Relationship in

the State Courts, 3 F.R.D. 98, 102
(1942).
33 Cunningham, Should Instructions Go Into the Jury Room?, 33 CAL. S. B. J.
278 (1958). One federal judge who has experimented in the presentation of
jury instructions uses a procedure whereby the jury may be re-instructed by
tape recording. See Katz, Reinstructing the Jury by Tape Recording, 41 J.
Ai i. JUD. Soc'Y 148 (1958).
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with the presentation of legal material could possibly produce some
highly beneficial results. One such experiment has already been conducted. judge Swain of the California Superior Court, with the cooperation of faculty members at the University of Southern California
Law School, presented a set of damage instructions to a class of freshmen law students. He prepared a questionnaire based on those instructions and after the reading, gave each member of the class a copy
34
of these questions. Not a single member of the class passed the test.
Naturally, the results of the test are inconclusive, since there was no
control of the many invariables involved in such an experiment. However, the test should illustrate the possible benefits which could be
obtained from further experimentation by those qualified to conduct
them.
Up to this point, the primary consideration has been the role of
the judge in the instruction process, and, only incidentally, the part
played by the attorney. The role of the attorney naturally varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending upon the standards adopted within the particular state. The traditional role played by the attorney has
been to aid the court in determining the applicable law to be given in
the charge. Some jurisdictions put the full responsibility upon the attorneys in drawing up the instructions to be given or not given. This
method has been criticized on the grounds that partisan attorneys make
the instructions unduly slanted and overemphasize the aspects of the
law which are favorable to their case. It is argued that this procedure
leaves the jury confused and befuddled.
But it is manifested that it is impossible for counsel engaged in
a contested trial to do anything impartial, that it is not their concern; and the result is that the instructions which they prepare
are as onesided as it is possible to make them. Accordingly, they
are not always easy for an experienced lawyer to analyze and
understand, much less for a jury.35
The general procedure followed in most jurisdictions is to put the
attorney in the role of the consultant. He recommends the instructions
to the judge but the final responsibility for which instructions are given,
and in what form, rest with the presiding judge. This is especially true
in criminal cases where the judge is under a higher duty in charging
the jury.36
The role played by the attorney in actually presenting the instructions to the jury depends in many instances upon the discretion of the
trial judge. As previously pointed out, those jurisdictions which require the judge's instruction to precede the final arguments'of counsel
generally allow the attorney to argue the application of the law to the
3- Swain, supra note 1, at 412.

35
Soper, The Charge to the Jury, J. Amd. Jun. Soc'Y 111, 114 (1940).
36
Supra note 6.
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facts of the case." Although this rule has generally been criticized on
the grounds that it destroys the effect of the impartial presentation by
the judge, it should be noted that this ability to argue the application
of the law to specific facts has been shown to increase the understandability and meaningfulness of instructions. It should also be considered
that in presenting an additional explanation of the governing law, the
attorney is under no such restriction as the judge as to commenting on
the evidence, so that he is completely free of the danger of appellate
reversal on this ground.
Some courts allow the attorney to read the instructions to the jury
during their argument. Though this practice has been disapproved by
appellate courts,38 it is not quite clear on what grounds. As seen before,
repetition of material may lead to an increase in comprehension. Considering the fact that the attorneys are vitally interested in the outcome
of the litigation, it is submitted that the attorney would not fall into
the same traps judges so often are unable to avoid. Certainly, an attorney who is swept up in a substantial contest on behalf of his client
would not discuss or read the instructions in a monotone voice, lacking
conviction, or deliver the material too rapidly for comprehension.
In those jurisdictions where the judge delivers the instructions after
the argument of counsel, it is often the practice to notify the attorneys
before their arguments as to the content of the instructions ultimately
to be given. Though this generally is done so that the attorneys may
have an outline of the portions of testimony to emphasize, some trial
judges allow the attorneys to argue the law as to be given by the judge.
This is usually held to be within the discretion of the trial judge and
many judges hold that reference to the law to be instructed upon invades the province of the judge.
In contrast to both the English and American method, many of the
continental judges, particularly the French, are not allowed to sum
up at all. Counsel addresses the jury as to the applicable law and are
given full responsibility for this phase of the jury trial. The commentators have generally dismissed this procedure as entirely unacceptable.
Viewers of the French system have remarked that the juries take the
law into their own hands and acquit or convict according to their own
views after hearing the prosecution and the defense.3 9 The American
trial has been characterized as basically an adversary proceeding; the
pull and tug of opposing counsel bringing factual truth to the surface.
This being so, perhaps further investigation into a system such as that
of the French would be warranted on the basis that such a pull and
tug of opposing counsel on the law might also stimulate the minds of
3, Raymond, supra note 14.
38 Boreham v. Byrne, 83 Cal. 23, Pac. 212 (1890); People v. Conley, 134 Cal.
App. 2d 580, 582, 285 P. 2d 693, 694 (1955).
39 Sokolov, supra note 4, at 230-231.
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the jurors, and through their respective presentations instill in the
juror's mind an understanding of the controlling law. With the restriction that the law presented be first approved by the presiding judge
so that each counsel is not presenting divergent law to the jury. this
process might prove to be of some merit.
CONCLUSION

It appears that an investigation into the area of jury instructions
would lead to certain basic conclusions and propositions:
1. The apathy toward jury instructions, due to their ineffectiveness,
can only increase unless changes are made in the ritual as we know it
today.
2. Both the trial and appellate courts must shift their concern from
the technical correctness or the legal language contained within the instruction, and focus their attention on the meaningfulness of instructions and the interests of the jurors who are being presented the material, remembering that they are laymen and not lawyers.
3. Oral instructions are to be preferred over the reading of written
instructions since presentation and delivery has been shown to have
a definite effect upon the comprehension of the listener.
4. The presentation of instructions prior to the arguments of counsel
appears to have merit, since it would lead to a repetition of the instruction which increases comprehension. Secondly, the attorney could relate
the law to specific facts, thereby increasing meaningfulness.
5. Some freedom on the part of the judge to comment on the facts of
the case would appear to be desirable in order to increase the meaningfulness of the instruction. The judge could still be restricted as to
commenting on the weight of the evidence without losing the increased
effectiveness of the instruction.
6. Further investigation into the manner of presenting jury instructions is warranted as communication of the instruction is as essential
as its legal correctness. Experimentation in the field of educational
psychology could lead to concrete proposals for improvement.
7. The role of the attorney in the instruction process warrants further
investigation. Perhaps a blending and further emphasis of the respective
roles of judge and attorney could add new effectiveness to the process
of instruction.
Perhaps this subject can best be concluded by bringing to light the
view of one juror who has gone through the instruction ritual, and his
reflections as to how the process may be made more meaningful. The
juror analyzed the problems in this way:
Instructions to the jury, within my experience, have consisted
entirely of the judge reading to the jury a number of assorted
legal paragraphs from a variety of law books. This reading by
the judge has always been in a flat and unmodulated voice and

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

very frequently in such low tones that at least some parts were
not audible to the jurymen. Then too, the matter read by the
judge is in definitely technical, legal language and much of it is
more confusing than helpful to the lay mind. I definitely feel
that the judge in actual practice adds to, rather than diminishes,
the confusion already established in the mind of the juror by
the claims, counterclaims and maneuvers of the attorneys. To my
mind, great good could be accomplished if, in instructing the
jury, the judge could come down off the bench (both mentally
and physically) and in plain language of the street and in emphatic accents discuss the main points of the case. 40
WYLIE A. AITKEN

40

Letter in the possession of Chief Justice David M. Moffatt, Supreme Court
of Utah.

